The
results of the ongoing general elections in India are due to be out on 16th
May 2014. However, one cannot escape the inevitability of BJP’s Narendra Modi
forming the next Government at the centre. This article is a humble effort to
try and analyse the possible implications for India ’s
foreign policy if Narendra Modi becomes India ’s Prime Minister.
Would
India ’s
clout in global forums rise with Modi as PM?
Narendra
Modi has already been hailed as someone who can woo foreign investment.
Perhaps, Narendra Modi as PM might enable better relations with major
countries, especially those that are seeking to invest in India . Notable
amongst such countries would be the United Kingdom (UK), which has already
expressed interest in investing in Mumbai-Bangalore corridor1.
Perhaps, Modi as Prime Minister would herald an era when India is looked
up to as a great investment destination, a country that welcomes and protects
overseas investments2. Maybe India ’s
standing in G-20 will increase and with increased economic clout, maybe India would
also gain diplomatic clout. Such a reading, or thinking, would suggest that
Narendra Modi as PM would be beneficial for furthering of India ’s foreign
policy objectives. Note, the above optimistic reading is based on the crucial
assumption that a Narendra Modi-led NDA Government would be more effective and
efficient, in so far as creating suitable ‘business environment’ is concerned,
as compared to the Congress-led UPA Government.
Even
if we assume that Narendra Modi as PM would indeed elevate India ’s economy and her relative importance for
the world, nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether Narendra Modi as the face
of India would be beneficial
for India ’s
many of the foreign policy objectives.
Problems
of perceptions: Modi as PM might dampen relations with Muslim-majority
countries
Even
if we assume that Narendra Modi had no role to play for whatever happened in Gujarat in 2002, it still cannot be denied that he
carries that baggage. Whether Modi is being targeted unjustly or not could be
debated. However, the more important thing is that the world perceives the man
to have been at the helm when the riots (or “genocide”) occurred. International
agencies like Amnesty International, who often possess the remarkable ability
to dictate the international media’s (read Western media’s) perception of a
person or a Government, have already been quite critical of Narendra Modi3.
It is not difficult to envisage a situation where newspapers in some parts of
the globe (besides Pakistan )
carry headlines that the “Butcher of Gujarat elected as India ’s next
PM”. In no way do I seek to suggest that such a headline would necessarily
be a correct or just portrayal. Nevertheless, it does pose problems of
perception. Especially, how would the Muslim world react?
Even
if we assume Governments to be pragmatic and expect no change in their desired
stance vis-à-vis India ,
however we cannot assume the same for the general population in Muslim
countries. It is reasonable to assume that Governments in some Muslim-majority
countries might find it difficult to increase strategic cooperation with India . This
question would become pertinent in case of Iran
(with whom India
has envisaged the “North South corridor”) and Afghanistan4
(which is slated to bid farewell to NATO troops in 2014). Moreover, any
Government in Pakistan might find it difficult to reach any compromise(s) or
peace deal with India, if the Indian PM is perceived as being a “hawk” and/or
responsible for deaths of Muslims in 2002.
Why
we cannot ignore many of the Muslim-majority countries
It
is not my intent to repeat the well known facts about Indian expatriates in the
Persian Gulf or the economic clout of Arab
countries to emphasize on my point. Rather I would refer to two specific
instances to make my case.
First,
I would like to draw attention to a potential diplomatic crisis for India ,
which thankfully never happened. In 1994, Pakistan
was set to take India to
UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Commission) over violations in Kashmir . The plan was to table a resolution condemning India , with Pakistan being the prime mover and
having the support of the 54-country strong OIC (Organisation of the Islamic
Conference). Retired diplomat MK Bhadrakumar explains that there was high
probability of the UNHRC adopting the draft resolution (condemning India ) if it
was tabled5. More worryingly, that could have
paved the way for reopening of the Kashmir
issue in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council). Remember, it was 1994, the
Soviet Union had just broken up and Russia was looking weak and unsure.
Consequently, India could
not be assured of a Russian veto if ever the Kashmir
issue came up to UNSC. Therefore, it became imperative to kill the draft
resolution in the UNHRC itself.
It
was at that time that India
turned to Iran .
India ’s then Foreign
Minister himself went to Tehran to deliver a
letter from Prime Minister Narsimha Rao to Iran ’s
President Rafsanjani, asking Iran ’s
intervention to block/derail the draft resolution at the OIC (Organisation of
Islamic Conference). Iran
acquiesced and reportedly blocked the draft resolution. The resolution was
never tabled at the UNHRC and Pakistan
since then has largely abandoned efforts to bring the Kashmir
issue into the UN. It is difficult to imagine if the Government of a Muslim-majority
country (like Iran ) would
find it possible to again cooperate with India given Modi’s negative image
problem.
The
second instance that merits revision is the alliance India had with
Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance in late-1990s (in their war against the
Pakistan-backed Taliban)6. It is obvious that India had to support the Northern Alliance as Pakistan was on
the other side. However, it should not obscure the fact that supporting the
Northern Alliance was also vital to India ’s security interests. It is
in India ’s interest to
prevent Afghanistan from
turning into a base/safe-haven for extremist groups who are intent on spreading
terrorism in India .
Of course, many of BJP’s committed supporters are unlikely to be aware of the
divisions within Afghanistan
and that a substantial part of the militias are strongly anti-Pakistan. In
fact, when the legendary Commander of the Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Massoud
was assassinated in September 2001, the weeping crowds chanted “Death to Pakistan ” in
his funeral procession7. Indians need to be aware that we
have old and potential allies in the so-called “Muslim world”, vital for India ’s
security needs. Unfortunately a pervasive hatred for Muslims (as is harboured
by many of BJP’s committed supporters) would only hurt India ’s
interests. The issue of Afghanistan becomes all the more pertinent as the US
(and the NATO) is set to withdraw combat troops from the country this year and
as the Taliban steadily continues to regain strength, setting the stage for a
possible re-emergence of civil war in Afghanistan.
On
the positive side, Modi as PM could have the chance to make progress on
Indo-Pak peace
At
this point it might be useful to recall the similar case of Israel ’s strongman-turned-PM Ariel Sharon . As Defence
Minister in 1982, Sharon gained notoriety for
having allegedly overseen and abetted the massacre of Palestinians in Lebanon .
Expectedly, among a few sections in Israel , Ariel Sharon was hailed as
a hero and he built a reputation of a strongman. He eventually entered politics
and made a series of provocative acts against Palestinians (most notable being
his visit to Temple
Mount in September 2000
while he was in opposition, which was one of the main events leading to armed
uprising by Palestinians). Ariel Sharon in Israel was supported by those who
favoured a ‘tough’ policy with the Palestinians. Eventually, Sharon won elections and became the Prime
Minister in March 2001.
Yet,
for all his reputation of being a ‘strongman’, what Ariel Sharon could do was
something the Left-leaning and ‘Labour’ Prime Ministers could not. He, as Prime
Minister, agreed to vacate Gaza
in 2005 and hand it over to Palestinians, dismantling all the Israeli
settlements in the Gaza Strip8. Unfortunately, this concession
by Sharon has been inadequate to achieve lasting
peace between Israel and Palestine . Nevertheless,
the reasons for lack of peace are an entirely different subject matter
altogether and not the focus of this article. The important point to be noted
is that Sharon as Prime Minister could give significant concessions (and hence
further the peace process), without having to worry about anybody branding him
“weak”.
Similarly,
Narendra Modi has already established his image of a “strongman”, of a
“loh-purush” (man of steel). Therefore, he might find it easy to make
compromises and enter into a peace-deal with Pakistan . However of course, a lot
would depend on Pakistan ’s
ability to reciprocate.
Conclusion
Thus,
the prospect of Narendra Modi becoming the next PM raises concerns that India ’s
strategic partnership with a number of Muslim-majority countries might be
hampered. However, his credentials as a “strongman” might give him some leeway
in accommodating Pakistan
and hence help in furthering the peace process. Obviously, only time will tell
whether or not India ’s
geopolitical interests are furthered under Modi as PM.
Endnotes:
1 Refer
to The Hindu, (December 25, 2013) “Linking India ’s financial centre with its
IT hub” http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/linking-indias-financial-centre-with-its-it-hub/article5497947.ece
2 The
BJP’s election manifesto accuses the UPA government of having unleashed
"tax terrorism" and "uncertainty", an apparent reference to
the Vodafone tax issue and the GARR (General-Anti-Avoidance-Rule). It seems BJP
would be keen to avoid any similar episode of retroactive taxation when in
power.
3
Refer to Amnesty International’s statement in 2012 where it hints at Modi’s
possible involvement in 2002 riots but also mentions about lack of any evidence
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA20/006/2012/en/e77dabb7-151f-410e-93c9-68513bd3eebc/asa200062012en.html
4
Refer to Time (April 2011), “Afghanistan :
India 's Uncertain Road ” for an understanding
of India-Pakistan rivalry playing out in Afghanistan http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2062364-2,00.html
5
Refer to Rediff (October 2005), “Revealed: What Iran
did for India
and why it is hurt” http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/03spec1.htm Also refer to Frontline (April
2002), “An Iranian sister” http://www.frontline.in/navigation/?type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl1907/19070560.htm
6
Refer to Sumit Ganguly (January 2012), “India ’s
Role in Afghanistan ”,
CIDOB Policy Research Project, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs
7
Refer to BBC (September 2001), “Thousands mourn anti-Taleban leader” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1546941.stm
8
Refer to Washington Post (August 2005), “Israeli Withdrawal From Gaza Explained” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/10/AR2005081000713.html